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New Zealand is presented as a microcosm of European colonialism due to its short and relatively well documented history. The islands are ecologically unique, with the vast majority of species existing nowhere else in the world. Niches occupied by mammals in most of the world are instead occupied by flightless birds and creatures like the weta. The area was first settled by Polynesians about 1000 years ago, and these Māori people made short work of transforming much of the thick forest into farmland for Polynesian crops like taro. Unique New Zealand species like the giant flightless moa were extinct by the time the first Europeans, Abel Tasman and James Cook, set foot on the New Zealand coast.
Despite their own colonial efforts, the Māori had a number of disadvantages to the Europeans. They did not embark on long sea journeys like their Polynesian ancestors, so no trade of cultural or physical goods existed to help them add to their suite of crops or develop advanced weapons. Since Polynesia is tropical, many of the plant species brought with the first Māori failed to thrive in temperate New Zealand. They lived in divided tribes, so Europeans made a concerted effort to align with certain Māori groups and use their local knowledge to defeat the tribes who were more resistant to the incomers, much like they did in the Canary Islands and other locations without united societies. The first groups of Europeans to arrive in the 18th century went to New Zealand to hunt whales and seal for export back to Europe. They quickly killed off a large portion of these animals but found New Zealand itself to be a welcoming environment with a climate much like that of the British Isles, apart from a few uninhabitable zones of jungle and high peaks on the west coast of the South Island. The groups of Europeans to settle there permanently were primarily missionaries on a quest to save the souls of the Māori (and in turn persuade them to become laborers on European whaling vessels worldwide). Despite these early efforts, European immigration to New Zealand did not find real success until the middle of the 19th century. There was simply not enough there to attract Europeans—the natural New Zealand landscape may be climactically similar to Europe but shares almost none of its ecological features—and the Māori lived there in such great numbers that outcompeting them was a difficult task.
Crosby’s analysis suggests that the success of New Zealand as a Neo-Europe happened almost accidentally. Since the land was so isolated for such a long time, European weeds and diseases took hold there even more rapidly than they did in other Neo-Europes. By the time of New Zealand’s colonization, colonies in the Americas had already existed for hundreds of years, so American crops were among the variety of plants the Europeans brought with them. The Māori were very attracted to crops like the potato, which was similar to their Polynesian sweet potato but much easier to cultivate in New Zealand’s environment. Agricultural colonialism was a huge asset to the first European settlements on the northern coast of the North Island. The slow trickle of Europeans into these settlements meant that while they killed many Māori with foreign disease, they did not, at first, make a concerted effort to eradicate the people. Instead, they made efforts to integrate them into the European lifestyle, teaching them about Christianity and European farming. Crosby states, “The Māori near these villages and outposts became increasingly alienated from their own traditions and served to carry European ideas, techniques, devices, and vices deeper into New Zealand” (234). The burgeoning population of European-Māori children also helped subsume Māori culture into that of Europe.
As the 19th century progressed, more and more Europeans moved to New Zealand. They made a concerted effort to “educate” the Māori beyond just farming techniques by teaching them to read English in great numbers, which furthered their vulnerability to European cultural brainwashing. Contemporary accounts, which are to some extent stated as fact in Ecological Imperialism, describe the Māori as eagerly accepting of European ideas but confused as to how to implement them, putting their new white man’s clothes on “upside down and backward” (236) and asking Europeans which side of the cow was the front. The accuracy of these accounts must be questioned; despite their unfamiliarity with European specific animals and fashions prior to the 18th century, the Māori were a complex, intelligent society. These descriptions of their bumbling confusion about European ways of life seems more to be an intentional infantilization by whoever wrote the accounts, perhaps a way to attract more Europeans hoping to save the savage natives.
Whatever techniques were used to draw Europeans to New Zealand, by the 1840s they certainly worked. European plants and animals lived across the country by that time, and European immigration expanded rapidly. Direct conflict with the Māori began to increase; the native population had been introduced to European weapons and were beginning to realize they must unify their efforts to avoid their entire country being stolen. In many ways, this effort was too little, too late. British settlers, who had taken all the most desirable land and given the Māori their diseases in exchange, reproduced at a faster rate and had healthier offspring than the Māori. In 1840, several North Island Māori leaders met to form a plan for how to preserve their lands and traditions from further takeover. Some leaders believed that making a pact with the British was the only way to ensure fair treatment. Although resistance to this idea was strong—after all, they had seen how similar efforts had failed in Australia and the Americas—European influence guided many influential Māori, and ultimately 50 tribal leaders signed an agreement to allow Britain to annex New Zealand in exchange for their lands being preserved. The text of Ecological Imperialism describes this agreement as an effort to preserve Māori culture and people as a whole albeit an effort that even the Māori leaders knew was risky. Since many of these leaders had close contact with the British and were highly educated, it seems likely they had a more self-centered motive. Aligning themselves with the British may have protected their own personal followers and power, but as soon as New Zealand became part of the British empire, the takeover accelerated until little trace of Māori presence existed in New Zealand.
European plants, animals, and people filled the landscape. Major disease outbreaks declined as the Māori gained immunity and received vaccines, but disease continued to damage the most remote groups well into the 19th century. Sexually transmitted diseases were particularly problematic; they spread more slowly than other illnesses and often caused infertility, so outbreaks continued longer and decreased populations by multiple means. By the end of the 19th century, Māori populations in New Zealand dropped from hundreds of thousands of people to 42,113 according to the 1896 census. Crosby primarily attributes this to disease, but other factors certainly played a part. One factor not considered in the text is the self-identity of New Zealand’s residents. Māori and British people often had children together, and there was strong pressure on Māori people to look and act more like the British. Although many Māori leaders pushed for cultural unity (something that was unthinkable before the British arrived), many Māori people, especially those with British heritage, may have identified more strongly as citizens of a British colony rather than as Māori. This may have played a part in the apparent decline of Māori-identifying people in census records.
To contrast the Māori who tried to become more British, a nationalist movement gained ground among other Indigenous New Zealanders in the 1850s. A king, Potatau I, was selected, and the nationalists began to print a Māori newspaper calling for a return to traditional ways of life and strict rejection of Europeans and their lifestyle. This was likely the first real push toward conservation efforts in New Zealand as well as a successful effort to encourage many Māori to fight in formal battle against the British. This war lasted for around 20 years, first as a formal conflict between Māori and British troops, then as a series of guerrilla battles between a number of different factions. Although the Māori fought for years, the cards were already stacked against them, and New Zealand was definitively British by 1875.
Crosby concludes by revisiting and expanding on its broad ideas about why certain areas developed into Neo-Europes while others did not. It is well established throughout the book that the geographic remoteness of the Neo-Europes was critical in their becoming what they are today. Millions of years of isolation, apart from a few brief periods of access across remote land bridges, meant that Australasian and American species were distinct from those of Europe. In Chapter 11, the book expands on this idea, stating that the biota in the Neo-Europes was probably less diverse than that in Eurasia and Africa. There is no direct evidence given for this, and when considering the Americas in particular it seems somewhat unlikely. The Americas when considered as a whole have a huge range of different ecosystems, very similar to Eurasia and Africa in their climactic range. It may be true that human cultural and biological exchange in Eurasia and Africa caused more plant species to exist in more places due to human introduction, but there is no evidence presented to indicate that the biota of the Americas, New Zealand, or Australia was naturally simpler than that of Eurasia.
What is clear throughout the final chapters of the book is that humans themselves were an invasive species everywhere outside Eurasia and Africa. The New World did not have a native population of any large, intelligent primate, so humans were the first animals of their type to enter many areas of the world. This gave them a number of advantages: by the time they first walked into Australia and the Americas, humans were skilled hunters able to take down even the most elusive of Old World prey. Meanwhile, the animals who had not evolved alongside humans had no natural fear of them, so hunting the huge Pleistocene creatures was probably a relatively easy feat. Crosby stands by the belief that humans were the primary cause of Pleistocene extinctions, though it points out that many archaeologists and paleontologists may disagree. In the time since the book was written, the theory of human-driven extinction has gained more traction than it had in the 1980s. Although the changing climate as the world exited the Ice Age was probably an accelerating factor, more and more evidence is emerging to suggest that Crosby was correct; humans spread across the world, found large animals that could be hunted easily, and brought diseases to which the New World animals were vulnerable. This in turn caused a rapid expansion of human population, and in a very short period across a huge swath of the world a number of Pleistocene animals, such as the giant sloth and the wooly mammoth, disappeared forever. Thousands of years later, this loss aided the European invaders in their conquest of these areas. Crosby reports that in the New World “[t]here were no mammalian carnivores to compare in size with the Old World’s lions and tigers, and no herbivores to compare with the elephant, rhinoceros, or hippopotamus” (274). This picture is somewhat incomplete. Although the number of large mammal species, especially herbivores, was certainly lower in the New World than in Eurasia and Africa, there were and still are a number of apex predators native to the Americas that compare in size and ferociousness to those in the Old World. Early American settlers had to face multiple types of bear, mountain lions, wolves, jaguars, etc. Although in the present day these animals are relegated mostly to remote areas with little human contact, this is a relatively recent development. At least in North America, both mountain lions and wolves ranged across most of the landscape until the 19th century. It seems unlikely that early settlers feared these beasts less than the predators of the Old World, as evidenced by the fact that they killed them in huge numbers.
Ultimately, Crosby concludes that the first waves of large-scale human migration during the Pleistocene were like “[s]hock troops—marines—seizing beachheads and clearing the way for the second wave” (295). This metaphor seems accurate considering all the information presented in the book, and it mostly aligns with more modern research in many of the areas discussed. The South America pampa is revisited as an example of exactly what this means. The pampa lies thousands of miles away from the Bering Strait, and getting between the two means crossing a number of dangerous barriers like vast deserts and the jungle of Central America. It is likely that the pampa was one of the last American ecosystems to be invaded by humans. This meant that when the first European explorers arrived there, the landscape was still recovering from the first wave of human disturbance. Crosby suggests this made Europeanization of the area especially easy since the native grasses and animals were still in a vulnerable state.
In its conclusion, the book describes how, no matter the exact nature of why the Neo-Europes worked so well, the success of colonization in North America was a driving factor in creating Neo-Europes in other areas. From the 1600s forward, Europeans started coming to the Americas in a bigger and bigger wave, which did not begin to break until the middle of the 20th century. This success prompted Europeans, especially wealthy explorers and industrialists, to have an extraordinarily optimistic outlook about the ability to colonize any environment. This optimism, combined with the practice of exporting enslaved people and indentured servants as the first test subjects in new lands, meant that European colonialism had a great chance of success even in harsh areas. The only thing that could prevent it, it seems, was the European citizens’ failing to be convinced that a place was better than Europe. This is the case in places like Guiana, where Europeans were encouraged to move for many years but where the remoteness and unappealing environment meant few actually settled there. In North America, Australia, New Zealand, and the like, Europeans found a climate that was not only very livable but was (at least at first) devoid of much competition from other Europeans. They began to move to and transform these places in droves as soon as they were able, bringing their biota with them, and thus the Neo-Europes were born.
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